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Abstract: The part of software based systems in a car is growing. Moreover, in the next years 
will emerge the X-by-Wire technology that intends to replace mechanical or hydraulic systems 
by electronic ones even for critical function as braking or steering. This requires a stringent 
proof that these new vehicles will ensure the safety of driver, occupants, vehicle and 
environment. In this paper, we intend to list certain activities and key points for ensuring the 
development of a safe and optimized embedded system. More precisely, we propose two main 
axis that contribute to establish a design methodology of such systems. The first one identifies 
the generic components of an embedded system  while the second one details how to model and 
validate the embedded system throughout the different steps of the development process. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
While automobile production is likely to increase 
slowly in the coming years (42 millions cars produced 
in 1999 and only 60 millions planned in 2010), the 
part of embedded electronics and more precisely 
embedded software is growing. The cost of electronic 
systems was $37bn  in 1995 and  $60bn in 2000, with 
an annual growth rate of 10%.  
The reasons for this evolution are technological as 
well as economical. The cost of hardware components 
is decreasing while their performances and reliability 
are increasing. The emergence of embedded 
fieldbuses leads to a significant reduction of the 
wiring cost. Finally, software technology facilitates 
the introduction of new functions whose development 
would be costly or even not feasible if using only 
mechanical or hydraulic technology and allows 
therefore satisfying the end user requirements in terms 
of safety and comfort.  
Who is concerned by this evolution? First the vehicle
customer, for which the requirements are on the one 
hand, the increase of performance, comfort, assistance 
for mobility efficiency (navigation), … and on the 
other hand, the reduction of vehicle consumption and 
cost. Furthermore he requires a reliable embedded 
electronic system that ensures safety properties. 
Secondly, the stakeholders, car makers and suppliers,
who are interested in the reduction of time to market, 
development cost, production and maintenance cost. 
Finally this evolution has a strong impact on the 
society: legal restrictions on exhaust emission, 
protection of the natural resources and of the 
environment, … 
In this presentation, we intend to list certain activities 
and key points for ensuring the development of a safe 
and “optimal” embedded system that is suited to the 
above mentioned requirements. For this purpose, we 
develop the context and the problematic in section 2. 
Then in sections 3 and 4, we propose two main axis 
that contribute to establish a design methodology of 
such systems. The first one identifies the generic 
components that compose an embedded system  while 
the second one details how the embedded system is 
modelled and validated along the different steps of the 
development process. 
2. CONTEXT  
2.1. Several domains and specific problems 
Traditionally, an in-car embedded system is divided in 
four domains that correspond to different 
functionalities, constraints and models. Two of them 
are concerned specifically with safety : “power train” 
and “chassis” domain. The third one, “body”, is 
emerging and presently integrated in major of cars. 
And finally, “telematic” and “Human Machine 
Interface” domains take benefit of continuous 
progress in the field of multimedia and internet. 
Power train 
This domain represents the system that controls the 
motor according to explicit solicitations of the driver 
(speeding up, slowing down, … ), implicit solicitations 
of the driver (driving facilities, fuel consumption, … ) 
and environmental constraints (exhaust pollution, 
noise, … ). Moreover, this control has to take into 
account requirements from other parts of the 
embedded system as climate control or ESP 
(Electronic Stability Program). Traditional tools 
dedicated for general control command applications 
are used for the development of power train systems 
(Matlab / Simulink, for example and simulation 
approach).  
In this domain, the main characteristics are: 
- at a functional point of view: different control laws, 
complex control laws (multi-variables), different 
sampling periods, …  
- at a hardware point of view: specific sensors 
(minimisation of the criteria “cost / resolution”), 
high computation power, high storage capacities, 
dedicated coprocessors (floating point 
computations), 
- at an implementation point of view: several tasks 
with different activation rules (different periods), 
stringent time constraints imposed to task 
scheduling, mastering safe communications with 
other systems and with  local sensors / actuators. 
Chassis  
It gathers systems as ABS (Antilock Braking System), 
ESP (Electronic Stability Program), ASC (Automatic 
Stability Control), 4WD (4 Wheel Drive), …  that 
control the chassis components (wheel, suspension, 
… ) according to requirements as steering, braking 
solicitations and several forces (ground, wind, … ). 
The characteristics of the chassis domain and the 
underlying models are similar to those presented for 
power train domain. 
Body  
Wipers, lights, doors, windows, seats, mirrors are 
more and more controlled by software based systems. 
This kind of functions make up the body domain. In 
this case, there are numerous functions, some of them 
being critical. They imply globally many 
communications between them and consequently a 
complex distributed architecture. There is an 
emergence of the notion of sub-system or sub-cluster 
based on low cost fieldbuses as, for example, LIN  
that connect modules realized as integrated 
mechatronic systems. On another side, the body 
domain integrates a central subsystem, termed the 
“central body electronic” whose main functionality is 
to ensure message transfers between different systems 
or domains. This system is recognized to be a central 
critical entity. 
Body domain implies mainly discrete event 
applications. Their design and validation rely on state 
transition models (as SDL, Statecharts, UML state 
transition diagrams). These models allow, mainly by 
simulation, the validation of a functional 
specification. Their implementation implies a 
distribution over a complex hierarchical hardware 
architecture. High computation power for the central 
body electronic entity, fault tolerance and reliability 
properties are imposed to the body domain systems. A 
challenge in this context is first to be able to develop 
exhaustive analyze of state transition diagrams and 
second, to ensure that the implementation respects the 
fault tolerance and safety constraints. The problem 
here is to achieve a good balance between time 
triggered approach and flexibility. 
Telematic and HMI (Human Machine Interface) 
Next generation of telematic devices provides new 
sophisticated Human Machine Interfaces to the driver 
and the other occupants of a vehicle. They enable not 
only to communicate with other systems inside the 
vehicle but also to exchange information with the 
external world. Such devices will be in the future 
upgradeable and for this domain, a “plug and play” 
approach has to be favoured.  
These applications have to be portable and the 
services furnished by the platform (operating system 
and / or middleware) has to offer generic interfaces 
and downloading facilities. The main challenge here 
is to preserve the security of the information from, to 
or inside the vehicle. Sizing and validation do not 
relies on the same methods than for the other 
domains. Here we shift from considering messages, 
tasks and deadline constraints to fluid data streams, 
bandwidth sharing and multimedia quality of service. 
2.2. A cooperative development process 
Strong co-operation between suppliers and carmakers 
in the design process implies the development of a 
specific concurrent engineering approach. In order to 
specify this process, synchronisation points 
(rendezvous) across the co-operative development 
model have to be identified and the information 
exchanged at these points must be characterised. 
Furthermore, an unique syntax of the exchanged 
information has to be defined and the development of 
reusable components is a main way for cost reduction. 
2.3. The emergence of X-by-Wire technology 
At present some critical functions are realised by 
software-based systems, as braking assistance, active 
suspension, steering functionalities etc.. They are 
subject to stringent timing constraints and more 
generally to dependability constraints. In the close 
future, these constraints will be more critical with the 
generalisation of X-by-Wire technology. X-by-Wire is 
a generic term used when mechanical and / or 
hydraulic systems are replaced by “ electronic”  ones 
(intelligent devices, networks, computers supporting 
software components that implement filtering, control, 
diagnosis, …  functionalities). For example, we can 
cite brake-by-wire, steer-by-wire, that will be shortly 
integrated in cars for the implementation of critical 
and safety relevant functions.  
Therefore the development of such systems must 
define an feasible system, i.e. satisfying these 
constraints. Conventional mechanical and hydraulic 
systems have stood the test of time and have proved to 
be reliable; it is not the same for critical software 
based systems. In aerospace / avionic industries, X-
by-Wire technology is currently employed; but, for 
ensuring safety properties, are used specific hardware 
and software components, specific fault tolerant 
solutions (heavy and costly redundancies of networks, 
sensors and computers) and certified design and 
validation methods. Now there is a challenge to adapt 
these solutions to automotive  industries that impose 
stringent  constraints on component  cost, electronic 
architecture  cost (minimisation  of  redundancies)  
and development length. Consequently,  there  is a 
real  need  for  mastering the cooperative development  



























Fig.  1. Generic component – generic architecture 
process of critical low cost electronic embedded 
architectures. 
3. FROM DEDICATED COMPONENTS TO 
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
Nowadays, most embedded sub-systems (hardware 
and software) are separately defined and developed. 
Each one is dedicated to a single functionality and is 
designed and tested as closed systems by a supplier 
according to the carmaker requirements.  
On the one hand, this is a bar to the reusability of 
solutions in other projects and on the other hand, this 
leads to oversize the resources (eg. number of ECUs, 
memory size, … ). In order to solve this problem, 
several proposals have been made for the structuring 
of an embedded system into generic components and 
generic architecture and, also, for defining the 
“ perimeter”  of the what is re-usable and / or portable 
(a component, a set of component, … ) 
For example, the French AEE project (AEE, 1999)  
and the European ITEA project EAST-EEA (EAST, 
2001) characterised formally the basic embedded 
components and defined the perimeter of the reusable 
ones. Furthermore they provided a generic 
architecture for an Electronic Control Unit (ECU), i.e. 
a station connected to one or several network(s) and 
supporting the embedded application.  
3.1. Component classes 
The generic model presented in Fig.  1 enables the 
development of components that are independent of a 
specific ECU. That is the case for Devices (sensors 
and actuators) and Application Software Components.
This independence is provided by two kinds of 
components: 
- middleware and communication software 
component that hide the distribution and specifically 
the ECU supporting an information producer; in 
fact, the middleware actually implements a global 
real time database, 
- sensors – actuators data base server whose function 
is to manage local data produced or consumed 
locally by devices directly connected to the ECU 
These two components furnish a common interface to 
Application Software Components and on the other 
hand they implement fault tolerant services. 
The communication between ECU and external actors 
are done thanks to Communication Protocol 
Components (data link layer for each connected 
network) and I/O Drivers that manage Input and 
Output for each device. 
All the components, except devices, are implemented 
in software; they are supported by ECU hardware and 
managed by an Operating System. So the last class of 
component is OS Software Components.
3.2. Critical components 
The safety properties of an embedded application 
depends on two points: 
- reliability of the hardware architecture, 
- properties on application behaviour. 
For the first point, several metrics are available in 
order to evaluate this reliability. For example, starting 
with values given by furnishers of hardware 
components, we can compute the probability that a 
hardware architecture fails in one hour or the mean 
time between failures. Consequently, it allows to 
verify that these values are less than an imposed one; 
for example, a probability of failure occurrence in one 
hour that is less than 10-9 ensures that the given 
architecture is relevant to SIL (System integrity 










Fig. 2. Functional "Active Suspension Control" 
component 
Note that this kind of evaluation is a necessary 
activity but not a sufficient one and the second point 
must be studied. It requires to have  a quantified and 
precise model of the software behaviour: tasks, 
messages, scheduling policies, protocols, …  For 
example, if we consider the power train or the chassis 
domain, the control laws impose stringent constraints 
that must be respected by an embedded architecture. 
For illustrate this, we analyse an “ active suspension”  
that realises a balance between comfort and control. 
This function takes three input data: vehicle speed 
(VS), steer position (SP) and state of the ABS system 
(ABS) and delivers four consistent commands to the 
four wheels (FL, FR, RL, RR) as shown in Fig. 2.  
The temporal properties that an implementation of 
this function must respect, assumed here to be 
realized by only one task, are of the following types 
(Fig. 3): 
- deadline on the response time of the algorithm 
implementing the control law, 
- freshness of the input data when consumed by this 
algorithm, 
- deadline on the response time of the message 
transmitting the output data to the wheel, 
- temporal consistency of the three input data, 
- temporal consistency of the four output data that 
have to be deliver in the same temporal window. 
How to specify and how to ensure these properties ? 
We list below some open issues. 
- Time Triggered Approach. Of course, the underlying 
products and techniques used in this approach allows 
a deterministic proof of the distributed application 
(TTP, 1999; Kopetz, 2002). Furthermore, by this 
way, fault detection and fault tolerant mechanisms 
are easier to introduce. Nevertheless, some problems 
must be addressed. In fact, if the specification of 
task activation is naturally deterministic and periodic 
for a control law, it is not the case for the sampling 
of driver solicitations (lights up, … ). The overload 
due to systematic periodic task activation or message 
transmission might be compatible with the strong 

























Fig. 3. Temporal constraints 
There is a lack of flexibility and ability to extend 
and modify the embedded architectures. Finally, a 
significant part of an embedded application is not 
subject to strict hard real time constraints. So a 
compromise between ensuring “ hard real time”  
constraints and “ soft real time”  constraints has to be 
found. A first response is given by protocols that 
allow a certain flexibility, as Flexray (Flexray, 
2001), TTCAN (Führer et al., 2000; Hartwich et al.,
2000), FTTCAN (Almeida and Pedreiras, 2000) or 
by Operating Systems as OSEK Time (OSEK-VDX, 
2001) that keeps slots for non deterministic tasks. A 
second one relies on specific scheduling techniques 
as the (m,k) firm approach that guaranties always m
satisfied deadline among k (Hamadoui and 
Ramanathan, 1995). Here the problem is the 
determination of m and k. Finally, deterministic 
approach and stochastic approach must be 
simultaneously used. 
- Robustness. A vehicle, in particular the embedded 
electronic, is subject to non permanent failures due 
to electromagnetic perturbations; the safety 
properties must be kept in these situations. The 
problem is here to identify and model realistic 
perturbation scenarios (Navet et al., 2000) and to 
propose a robust architecture (Gaujal and Navet, 
2003) that is an architecture respecting the safety 
constraints even under these perturbations. 
- Portability vs Safety. As we saw previously, the 
middleware is a central component for the 
portability of any embedded applications. Its main 
purpose is to act as a server of a global real time 
data base. Furthermore, for economical reasons, it 
has to offer a support for portable components, 
extensible applications, …  Therefore, an in-car 
embedded middleware has to be sized and adapted 
to the application requirements. The solution of this 
problem is relevant to complex discrete optimisation 
techniques under real time constraints. These 
problems are known to be NP-complete and, 
consequently, efficient heuristics have to be 
developed (Santos-Marques et al., 2003). 
4. ARCHITECTURE REFERENCE MODELS AND 
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
4.1. Development of a safe electronic embedded 
system 
The quality of an embedded system depends 
obviously of the quality of its development. It is well 
known that only testing the final product for ensuring 
that it respects its functional requirement under the 
required properties is not the best way to develop a 
complex system because it implies costly back loops 
on former design steps. For an efficient process, 
validation and verification activities must take place 
at each step, from end user requirements to final 
implementation. 
This leads to dispose of models of this system 
according to specific validation / verification 
techniques and consequently to the suited formalisms. 
Two remarks have to be done: 
- Several models. Validation / verification techniques 
are not the same at each level of the process; they 
don’t use the same modelling language or formalism 
and are not applied to same entities. For example, at 
end user requirement specification, a V&V activity 
can consist to prove the consistency of these 
requirements. The used formalism can be UML Use 
Cases, Message Sequence Charts, UML 
Collaboration Diagrams, …  No information about 
software or hardware components or about 
distribution are used for this activity. On the other 
hand, to verify that a proposed implementation will 
respect performance and temporal properties needs 
to develop, just before coding, models that can 
represent event occurrences in a quantified way. For 
this purpose, well suited formalisms are Timed 
Automata, Temporal Petri Nets, Queuing Systems, 
…  The modelled objects are tasks, frames, 
protocols, schedulers, memories, …  
- Modelling complexity. Designers that have a good 
knowledge of electronic embedded systems and 
specific constraints in automotive domain are 
usually not specialist of the above mentioned 
languages or formalisms. This is a bar to the massive 
use of formal techniques. 
A way to take account of these two points is to 
provide a domain oriented language that helps the 
designer to describe its system with its proper 
vocabulary and add a strict semantic to this language 
in order to furnish an automatic generation of formal 
models. At the present a lot of works are engaged in 
this way and main of them propose specific UML 
Profiles for achieving this purpose (OMG, 1999a; 
OMG, 1999b; Apvrille et al., 2001; Cavaliere et al.,
2001). Fig. 4 shows schematically how these 
principles can be used.  
For the description of component and architecture of 
component, computer science community engaged 
studies for the development of Architecture 
Description Languages (Taylor and Medvidovic, 
1997). Unfortunately, these languages are restricted to 
software domains. Few of them are concerned with 
discrete event applications  (Luckham, 1996; Allen 
and Garlan, 1997) or real time properties of an 
implementation (Vestal, 1993; Vestal,1995). 
4.2. Reference Architecture Models 
As explained in the previous section, a unique domain 
oriented language allows the representation of a 
system at each level of its development. This language 
is a declarative language for the modelling of 
components and architecture of components. At each 
design step, must be defined which component must 
be represented (classes and attributes) and how these 
components can be “ composed”  to form an 
architecture (relation, interaction, composition, … ).  
Furthermore, for traceability and model consistency 
purposes, the language has to provide a way for a 
formal description of the relation between 
components and architectures at different steps.  
In order to illustrate these concepts we propose below 
an abstract  of such a language, AIL_Transport  
(Elloy and Simonot-Lion, 2002)  that  was  developed   
in  the AEE Project (AEE, 1999).  AIL_Transport has 
been defined  as  a modelling language dedicated to 
the specification of architectures described as an 
assembly  of  standard  components. Every component 
is an instance of class belonging to a generic model, 
and it includes all pertinent characteristics necessary 
to the subsequent analysis of the whole architecture: 
interaction consistency, logical behavior, real-time 
performances, fault tolerant properties, …  





























Fig. 4. A unique language - several validation 
activities 
Using AIL_Transport, any designer describes the 
representation of an embedded architecture according 
to five different levels of abstraction. Each level 
models a particular point of view of the architecture. 
Entities specified at high levels (“ vehicle project”  
level and “ functional”  level) are abstract components. 
Entities specified at low levels are, on the one hand, 
ECUs and communication protocols at the “ hardware”  
level, on the other hand, the software and the devices 
(sensors and actuators) in the “ software”  level and the 
“ operational”  level. At each level, the designer 
describes the architecture as an assembly of objects 
instanced from predefined classes; then he specifies 
interactions between these objects using predefined 
connection types. The Fig. 5 illustrates these levels 
and their relationships. The development process 
associated to this representation links components 
introduced at different levels. 
Vehicle Project Level. The upper level describes an 
embedded application from a vehicle point of view. 
At this level, objects shall represent functionalities 
offered by a vehicle (ABS, cruise control, air 
conditioning, etc), the different variant of these 
services (manual or automatic climate control system, 
for example) and the set of “ on the shelf”  vehicle 
versions. Five main classes are used at this 
architecture level: Vehicle project, Vehicle 
type, Vehicle, Service, Variant. Mainly, 
these classes document the architecture and support 
the project validation in terms of model consistency. 
Functional Level. After building a validated vehicle 
model, the functional level describes one (or several) 
graph of elementary functional components realizing 
the services specified at the vehicle project level. 
Every graph of these components is specified 
disregarding the distribution and implementation 
aspects. The model supports a hierarchical 
specification of functions and flows. Function,
Functional Flow and Functional 
Architecture are the main classes used to build 
graphs of elementary functions. Documentation, 
formal validation and formal test generation are the 
main process activities fulfilled at this step.  
Hardware Level. This level models the electronic 
components of architecture as a set of processors, 
micro-controllers, electronic devices connected by 
networks. The main classes are  
- Operating Hardware. Objects whose main 
subclasses are ECU (Electronic Control Unit for the 
computation nodes) and Network 
- Dependent Software Component. These components 
are closely linked to hardware devices: Network 
Protocol, OS Software Components, I/O Drivers  
- Hardware Architecture that specifies how each node 
is connected on one or several networks. 
Software Level. At this level, two sets of classes are 
used. The first one is derived by class refinement of 
the functional architecture: the Application 
Software Components, the Software Flow,
the Instrumentation Hardware Objects
(Sensor and Actuators) and the Software 
Architecture. The second set of classes models 
the distribution of all software entities. For this, 
Software Component are decomposed in 
Logical Task communicating using Software 
Input and Software Output which are linked 
to Software Flow of the functional level. 
Moreover, the activation policies of Logical 









Fig. 5. Reference architectures during the design 
process 
In order to validate the approach, a prototype 
implementing the access to AIL_Transport compliant 
data base has been realised. Several model generators 
were developed: synchronised timed automata based 
model for performance evaluation of an operational 
architecture and graph-based model for automatic 
allocation and scheduling of periodic distributed 
activities.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The introduction of software based systems are 
growing in automotive domain. This new technology 
has to be mastered in an efficient way. First it must 
preserve the know-how of each actor (car makers and 
suppliers), ensure the ability of system extensions or 
modifications and allow the portability of 
components. Furthermore, several constraints are 
applied to their design process: on the one hand, the 
development length must be shortened and, on the 
other hand, the safety of the system has to be formally 
proved as soon as possible before the real 
implementation. In this paper, we presented two axis 
for research and development activities in this 
context: the first one is concerned by on line 
architectures and mechanisms while the second one is 
relevant to off line a priori modelling, validation and 
verification. 
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